List of Lubert-Adler Investors Revealed in Dillworth v. Ginn Lawsuit
Tesoro/Quail West bankruptcy trustee seeks to recover funds of alleged fraudulent distribution of half of $675M Credit Suisse loan. Claims money went to Bobby Ginn, Lubert-Adler and LA investors.
Palm Coast, FL – August 19, 2010 – A bankruptcy trustee’s dogged efforts to recover funds he alleges were fraudulently transferred to Bobby Ginn, Lubert-Adler, and Lubert-Adler investors continues to reveal more details about Ginn-LA (Bobby Ginn and financial partner Lubert-Adler). The most recent layer peeled from the onion disclosed the names of over 360 individuals and organizations invested in Lubert-Adler Funds III & IV.
The two funds are linked to Lubert-Adler’s investments in the bankrupted Ginn communities of Tesoro and Quail West. The two Ginn-LA ventures were liquidated via a chapter 7 bankruptcy precipitated in 2008 when Ginn-LA defaulted on a $675 million loan. Tesoro and Quail West sold for less than $25 million, leaving unsecured creditors including property owners and club members high and dry.
Trustee Drew Dillworth seeks to recover $148,000,000 which he alleges was looted from the developments, effectively shifting the risk associated with the projects to creditors, "leaving those creditors with a virtual certainty of loss." The alleged fraudulent transfers were paid to Bobby Ginn and Lubert-Adler entities, including Lubert-Adler Funds III & IV. The Fund III & IV monies were presumably transferred in turn to more than 360 Fund III & IV investors, hence their inclusion in the expanded list of defendants.
The list includes several individuals and high-profile institutions and funds. Presumably none are too pleased to have become a party to the lawsuit. They were issued summons on August 13. Each has until September 13 to answer. The list of Fund II & IV investors/defendants includes:
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The President and Fellows of Harvard College
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The Regents of the University of Michigan
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The John D and Catherine T MacArthur Foundation
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The Maryland State Retirement & Pension System
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The Ohio Police & Fire Pension Fund
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The Pennsylvania Public School Employees’ Retirement System
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The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania State Employees’ Retirement System
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Edward R. (Bobby) Ginn III
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Ira M. Lubert
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Dean S. Adler
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City of Philadelphia Sinking Fund Commission, as Trustee for the Philadelphia Gas Works Retirement Reserve Fund
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Employees Retirement Plan of Duke University
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Garfield Refining Company Profit Sharing Plan
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Jewish Federation of Greater Philadelphia
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Johns Hopkins University
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Kodak Retirement Income Plan Trust
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Lawrence S. Smith Profit Sharing Plan
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Northwest University
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Peacock Productions
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Philadelphia Health and Education Corportaion
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Prince Georges County Police Pension Plan
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Prince Georges County Fire Service Pension Plan
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Teachers Insurance and Annuity Assn of America
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The Washington University
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The Vanderbilt University
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The Trustees of Princeton University
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The Catholic Bishop of Chicago Endowment Fund
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The Metropolitan Museaum of Art
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The Rockefeller University
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The President and Trustees of Williams College
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Thomas Jefferson University Endowment Fund
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UNC Investment Fund, UR
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Unisys Master Trust
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United National Insurance Company
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University of Southern California
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University of Virginia Investment Management Company
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University of Oregon Foundation
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Wellesley College
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William Marsh Rice University
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Yale University
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Yale University Retiree Health Benefits Coverage Trust
For a complete list of defendants [click here]
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Crooksville
Those sleeze bags did the same thing at Cobblestone Park!
Hopefully Mr. Dillworth’s efforts will prevail so some "special" guys can spend time in the BIG house.
Suing on behalf of who?
Toby,
If this suit prevails who will actually be awarded damages? If the trustee represents a bankrupted community who would any recovery actually go to?
Reply to John
It was not the community that went bankrupt; it was the Ginn-LA entities that owned the remaining lots, the golf course and clubhouse. The bankruptcy trustee is trying to recover the money on behalf of the debtors. Credit Suisse was the secured debtor but in a similar case involving a Credit Suisse loan to the Yellowstone Club, the bankruptcy judge moved unsecured creditors into a position superior to CS. Here is what he said about the Yellowstone Club loan:
‘In 2005, Credit Suisse was offering a new financial product for sale. It was offering the owners of luxury second-home developments the opportunity to take their profits up front by mortgaging their development projects to the hilt. Credit Suisse would loan the money . . ., earn a substantial fee, and sell off most of the credit to loan participants. The development owners would take most of the money out as a profit dividend, leaving their developments saddled with enormous debt. Credit Suisse and the development owners would benefit, while their developments – and especially the creditors of the developments – bore all the risk of loss. This newly developed syndicated loan product enriched Credit Suisse, its employees[,] and more than one luxury development owner, but it left the developments too thinly capitalized to survive. Numerous entities that received Credit Suisse’s syndicated loan product have failed financially, including . . . Ginn. If the foregoing developments were anything like this case, they were doomed to failure once they received their loans [and made the transfers contemplated thereby].’
Reply to John
It was not the community that went bankrupt; it was the Ginn-LA entities that owned the remaining lots, the golf course and clubhouse. The bankruptcy trustee is trying to recover the money on behalf of the debtors. Credit Suisse was the secured debtor but in a similar case involving a Credit Suisse loan to the Yellowstone Club, the bankruptcy judge moved unsecured creditors into a position superior to CS. I presume that Dillworth will try the same tactic on behalf of the unsecured creditors. That list would include club members who lost their refundable deposits.
Here is what the judge presiding over the Yellowstone Club bankruptcy said about the Yellowstone Club loan:
‘In 2005, Credit Suisse was offering a new financial product for sale. It was offering the owners of luxury second-home developments the opportunity to take their profits up front by mortgaging their development projects to the hilt. Credit Suisse would loan the money . . ., earn a substantial fee, and sell off most of the credit to loan participants. The development owners would take most of the money out as a profit dividend, leaving their developments saddled with enormous debt. Credit Suisse and the development owners would benefit, while their developments – and especially the creditors of the developments – bore all the risk of loss. This newly developed syndicated loan product enriched Credit Suisse, its employees[,] and more than one luxury development owner, but it left the developments too thinly capitalized to survive. Numerous entities that received Credit Suisse’s syndicated loan product have failed financially, including . . . Ginn. If the foregoing developments were anything like this case, they were doomed to failure once they received their loans [and made the transfers contemplated thereby].’